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Abstract
Today’s college and university cybersecurity programs often contain multiple laboratory activities on various
different hardware and software-based cybersecurity tools. These include preventive tools such as firewalls,
virtual private networks, and intrusion detection systems. Some of these are tools used in attacking a network,
such as packet sniffers and learning how to craft cross-site scripting attacks or man-in-the-middle attacks. All
of these are important in learning cybersecurity. However, there is another important component of
cybersecurity education – teaching students how to protect a system or network from attackers by learning
their motivations, and how they think, developing the students’ “abilities to anticipate the strategic actions of
cyber adversaries, including where, when, and how they might attack, and their tactics for evading detection.”
This paper describes the content and implementation of a 6 hour 15 minute (5 class sessions) module in
Adversarial Thinking in a Network Security course, the students’ perceptions of the value and importance of
the module as a result of their anonymous responses to a survey on the module, and the statistical results of a
Data Breach Pretest-Posttest Assessment to measure how well they understood the concepts involved in
Adversarial Thinking as part of learning cybersecurity.
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Curriculum and Instruction | Information Security | Technology and Innovation
Comments
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At the annual symposium of NSA-CAE institutions in Miami, Florida, in November 2018 I was 
introduced to the Clark website, which contains many different modules in Cybersecurity 
education, all created by faculty at the various NSA-CAE institutions.  The depth of these modules 
range from just a lecture or two on a topic, to several weeks’ worth of material, to entire courses.  
The available topics include everything from lectures on social engineering to labs. The site was 
created and is maintained by NSA-CAE institution Towson University. 
Although my university has successfully used the material from the various publishers of our 
texts, we are always looking for new and original material to supplement our existing curriculum 
in cybersecurity.  Material from the Clark site seemed to be quite suitable for this purpose, varying 
from entire courses, to one to three week modules, to just one to two hour lessons.  Included in the 
Clark site are many different cybersecurity lab exercises, but one particular short module stood out 
as what could be a valuable addition to our 4000 level Network Security or Ethical Hacking classes 
– a module in Adversarial Thinking, or how to think like a hacker.  
The materials in the adversarial thinking module, including PowerPoint slides, exercises, and 
instructor notes and scoring examples, were obtained from the Clark site, and were created by 
Professor Seth Hamman at Cedarville University, in Cedarville, Ohio.  Together with Professor 
Ken Hopkinson, the description of the curriculum and findings from their work, which is 
referenced throughout this paper, was published in the Journal of the Colloquium for Information 
System Security Education (CISSE) in September 2016. 
This paper will explain what adversarial thinking is, the concepts underlying it and some of 
the exercises included in the module to teach the model.  It will describe the implementation of the 
module in a Network Security class during the spring, 2019 semester at Georgia Southern 
University, the statistical results of an exercise in that module, and the results of a survey of the 
students regarding the module.  Based on that data, a conclusion will be drawn as to the 
effectiveness of the module in teaching Adversarial Thinking.  
Why Teach Adversarial Thinking? 
Starting with our Fundamentals of Information Systems Security course, and throughout our 
cybersecurity curriculum, there are various references to the “hacker mindset”.  Hackers are 
categorized, based on their intent as “Black-hat”, “White-hat”, or “Gray-hat” hackers. (Oryiano 
and Solomon, 2008, p. 6-7)   Hacker motivation, whether it is financial, to demonstrate the ability 
to prove that the hacker is more powerful than defenders, or whether the activity is just because it 
is an exciting challenge, is taught in our Network Security and Ethical Hacking courses. So it is 
natural that we attempt to teach students how to out-think their opponent.  That ability is known 
as adversarial thinking. 
Indeed, as A. McGettick (2013) stated (as cited in Hamman and Hopkinson, 2016, p. 2) , “a 
team of subject matter experts convened by the Association of Computing Machinery (ACM) to 
identify cybersecurity curricular guidelines agrees that teaching adversarial thinking is vital.” The 
summary report of those subject matter   states, “To protect systems…we need to temporarily 
adopt the thinking process of the malevolent hacker…Developing this way of thinking must be 
part of [emphasis added]…educating cybersecurity professionals.”  
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In his paper, Fred Schneider (2013) wrote (as cited in Hamman and Hopkinson, 2016, p. 2), 
adversarial thinking is “the very essence of game theory. In it, actions by each player are 
completely specified; for cybersecurity and safety-critical systems, identifying possible player 
actions is part of the central challenge.” 
Although not a requirement when our university applied for NSA-CAE designation in 2015, 
the NSA-CAE required Knowledge Units (KUs) now includes in its Non-Technical Core – Cyber 
Threats (CTH) KU, the requirement that students should be able to “identify the bad actors in 
cyberspace and compare and contrast their resources, capabilities/techniques, motivations and 
aversion to risk.”  (NSA CAE-CD 2019 Knowledge Units, 2019) Consequently, it is not only 
important to teach adversarial thinking so that students can learn to out-think hackers and stay one 
step ahead of them, teaching it is a requirement for any college or university attempting to become 
designated or re-designated as an NSA-CAE/CDE. 
CONTENT OF THE ENTIRE MODULE 
The module consists of three primary lessons: an introduction to adversarial thinking; an 
introduction to game theory; and an introduction to behavioral game theory.  In the notes to the 
instructor, it is stated that each lesson can be taught in one hour, or three hours total.  In reality, 
with the time it took to describe, do, and discuss the results of each exercise in their entire module 
of three lessons, it took five class sessions of 75 minutes each, or six hours and fifteen minutes to 
complete.  In this section, each lesson is briefly described, as well as some of the student exercises 
used to teach the concepts. 
Lesson 1 – Introduction to Adversarial Thinking 
This lesson defines many of the terms that will be used in the module, its learning outcome being 
that after this lesson, “students will be able to analyze cybersecurity from the strategic perspective 
of cyber adversaries.” 
It began by having the students perform the Data Breach Exercise, used as a pretest.  The Data 
Breach Exercise will be described in greater detail below, but it is an important exercise because 
it is used a posttest at the end of the module to quantify how well the students learned the concepts.   
This lesson narrowed the definition of a computer hacker, especially with regard to the 
commonly taught “C-I-A Triangle” of confidentiality, integrity, and availability of systems and 
data.  It introduced the “3 B’s of Security,” components which are contained in “every security 
context: 
• Bounty – valuables that must be protected from bad guys 
• Bad Guys – persons who want to get their hands on the bounty, and 
• Barriers – obstacles placed between the bad guys and the bounty.” 
Lesson 1 made the valid point that without an adversary, an opponent, there is no need for 
cybersecurity.  Given that all systems contain “bounty,” there are bound to be adversaries, or “bad 
guys,” and thus the definition of adversarial thinking is “the ability to think like a hacker.” 
(Hamman, 2018, Lesson 1 slides, slide 13)  In slides 14 through 16, the lesson then proceeds to 
use cognitive psychology, the “study of higher mental processes, such as attention, language use, 
memory and perception, problem solving, and thinking to more precisely define what it means to 
think like a hacker.  In using Sternberg’s Triarchic Theory of cognitive intelligence, that “there are 2
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three distinct aspects of the intellect, analytical, creative, and practical” they further refine the 
definition by discussing how much book smarts (analytical), creative thinking (the ability to “make 
new and unique connections”), and practical intelligence (the ability to “plan, strategize, and 
accomplish goals”) affect the activities of a hacker.  (Hamman, 2018, Lesson 1 slides, slides 14-
16)   Consequently, their more precise definition is that “adversarial thinking is the ability to 
embody the technological capabilities, the unconventional perspectives, and the strategic 
reasoning of hackers.” (Hamman, 2018, Lesson 1 slides, slide 18)   
Lesson 2 – Introduction to Game Theory 
The second lesson introduced students to the concept of game theory, its learning outcome being 
that “students will be able to analyze a strategic scenario from a game theoretical perspective.”  
While game theory has been prominently used in economics, it can be applied to many different 
disciplines, from cybersecurity to warfare.  According to David Levine of UCLA, there are two 
types of game theory, cooperative, and non-cooperative.  Naturally we are discussing non-
cooperative game theory, which “deals with how intelligent individuals interact with one another 
in an effort to achieve their own goals.” (Levine, n.d.) 
Several different exercises were employed in this lesson to teach the students how game theory 
could be used to prevent an adversary from hacking a system.  In each exercise, the students were 
divided into groups, and the groups were required to evaluate the scenario from a game theory 
perspective and report their conclusions.   
Before performing the exercises, students were given the rules and several definitions.  The 
first definition is of game theory, “a mathematically rigorous approach to analyzing strategic 
contests (not games of skill or chance).”  For our exercise, it can be defined as “the study of 
interdependent decision making between multiple players where each player strives to maximize 
his utility.” (Hamman, 2018, Lesson 2 slides, slide 7)  Our three subsequent definitions are: 
• Players – the actors in the game. 
• Interdependent choices – the final outcomes for each player are dependent on all of the 
other player’s choices. 
• Utility preferences – an ordering of the outcomes for each player from least desirable to 
most desirable. 
The exercise described below was an actual historical scenario from World War II.  Entitled 
“The Battle of Bismarck Sea,” in which the Japanese fleet could sail a major convoy north of the 
island of New Britain, where they would encounter rain and poor visibility, or they could travel 
south of the island, where the weather would be fair.  In either case, the trip would take three days.  
The American commander, General George Kenney, had a choice: concentrate the bulk of his 
reconnaissance aircraft on the southern or northern route.  Once the convoy was sighted, his forces 
would attempt to destroy the Japanese convoy.  In making their decision, the students were asked 
to employ the concepts defined above. 
The student groups were asked: (1) who are the players?  That was obvious, they are General 
Kenney and the Japanese commander; (2) what are the interdependent choices available to the 
players?  Here it was for General Kenney to perform reconnaissance north or south of the island, 
and the Japanese commander to travel north or south of the island; and (3) what are the utility 
preferences for the players?  Not all of the students got this correct, but the correct answer is that 
this is “directly tied to the number of days of bombing (of the Japanese fleet by the allied fleet).”  3
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This ends up being a zero sum game – for the allies, the more days of bombing the better, for the 
Japanese, the less days the better.   
Students were asked to create what is known as a “normal form game grid.”  This is in Figure 
1.  In the grid, “the combination of Kenney N, Japanese S, represents 2 days of bombing.  This has 
a utility preference of 2 for Kenney and -2 for the Japanese.  Kenney’s gain was exactly the 
Japanese’s loss.  Figure 2 showed what game theory teaches us, and this was presented to the 
students after they had performed the exercise.  It showed that the optimal result is that Kenney 
should perform Reconnaissance North, guaranteeing two days of bombing, which was the expected 
value of the game.  This meant that the Japanese were in a disadvantage – they couldn’t win, and 
the best they can do is minimize the maximum damage, called the “minimax strategy.”  However, 
Kenney pursued the strategy that maximized the minimum damage, called the “maximin strategy.”  
Since this was a true story, we know what happened – game theory predicted it correctly – Kenney 
placed the bulk of his reconnaissance force to the north, the Japanese sailed to the north, and they 
encountered two days of bombing.  For Kenney, performing the reconnaissance north of the island 
is known as a dominated strategy, because it ensured that the Japanese would encounter a 
maximum days of bombing.  For the Japanese, traveling north was their dominated strategy, 








Figure 1: Normal Form Game Grid for Battle of the Bismarck Sea. Hamman, S., (2018), Lesson 2, slide 
21) 
  Japanese 
  N S 
Kenney N 2 2 
S 1 3 
Figure 2: Kenney’s dominating strategy is North row, Japanese dominating strategy is North column, 
and the optimal result for both “players” is cross-hatched intersection. Hamman, S., (2018), 
Lesson 2, slide 22) 4
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The importance of this exercise is that although students applied game theory to a military 
scenario, the same lesson can be applied to defending a computer network.  For example, 
knowing a vulnerability in a computer network, determining the optimal location (dominating 
strategy) to place an intrusion detection system in that network. 
Lesson 3 – Introduction to Behavioral Game Theory 
The final lesson teaches students how to apply what is known as “level-k reasoning” to create 
playing strategies in strategic contests; the learning outcome is that students will be able to 
“analyze cybersecurity from the strategic perspective of cyber adversaries.” 
In Lesson 3, it is stated that “one of the underlying assumptions of game theory is player 
perfect rationality, meaning that “players behave perfectly rationally to the nth degree when 
making strategic choices.”  (Hamman, 2018, Lesson 3 slides, slide 5)  However, this is not always 
the case, and a simple exercise illustrated the difference between analytical game theory and 
behavioral game theory. 
To illustrate this point, the students performed an individual exercise known as the 2/3s 
Guessing Game.  In this game, each student was asked to write down a whole number between 0 
and 100, inclusive.  Students were told not to look at anyone else’s number, and not to share their 
number.  Once everyone was done writing down their numbers, I collected the submissions, did a 
couple of calculations using Excel, and announced the winner.  The winner was the person who 
submitted the number closest to 2/3 of the average of all of the numbers submitted. 
This game is related to behavioral game theory for two reasons.  First, it is a theoretical game 
because it has: (1) players (the students); (2) interdependent choices – the whole numbers between 
0 and 100; and (3) utility preferences – losing and winning. 
Second, “the analysis of this game depends on the concept of dominated strategies, learned in 
Lesson 2.”  (Hamman, 2018, Lesson 3 slides, slide 7)  After calculating the answer, the highest 
possible winning number could only be 67, which is 2/3 of 100, but that would depend on each 
student choosing 100 as their answer.  This means that “all of the numbers between 68 and 100 
are dominated strategies, and should never be chosen under any circumstances.”  Consequently, it 
is necessary to re-do the game in the light of this.  So now what’s the highest possible winning 
number?  This would result in everyone choosing 67, and 2/3 of that is 45.  This means that now 
all of the numbers between 45 and 67 are also dominated strategies and should never be chosen.  
So not only can you see where this is going, but where would this process stop? (Hamman, 2018, 
Lesson 3 slides, slide 8)   
The process itself is called the “successive elimination of dominated strategies.”  With 
analytical game theory, this process would “continue all the way to the bottom.”  This 
demonstrates “player perfect rationality, that all the players would use a strict, logical analysis of 
the game.”  (Hamman, 2018, Lesson 3 slides, slide 9)  But people don’t really think that way.  In 
other games in the module, there are only “1 or 2 successive elimination of dominated strategies, 
and then the equilibrium is reached.” (Hamman, 2018, Lesson 3 slides, slide 9)  The goal for the 
player is to find the optimal number of iterations of the game before the player quits.  Each iteration 
is called a level, and this is called level-k reasoning. Most people “engage in between 0 and 3 levels 
of level-k reasoning,” and “most of the time, the level-2 strategy is a winner.” (Hamman, 2018, 
Lesson 3 slides, slide 15) 
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How can level-k reasoning be applied to cybersecurity?  The adversary finds a vulnerability 
in your network, you discover that he has discovered it, so you protect it.  Then he finds another 
vulnerability, so you protect that.  As defenders, cybersecurity professionals must determine how 
many layers of security, how many levels of security, they are willing to implement and pay for, 
to defend against each potential adversary and mitigate each potential vulnerability.  At some 
point, the cost of defending against a possible exploit with a very low probability of occurring 
becomes prohibitive, and thus we teach our students that is the point where the strategy of 
acceptance, accepting the very minor possibility of an attack, should be employed.  
The lesson closed with yet another exercise illustrating another important issue in adversarial 
thinking – the allocation of scarce resources.  Entitled “DDoS Attack,” students were given six 
websites, numbered 1 through 6, each with a value of 1.  Students were given 120 protection units.  
The students allocated their 120 protection units against a set strategy that was unknown when 
they made their allocations.  The set strategy of 2-31-31-31-23-2 was unveiled, and students scored 
themselves against it.  The literature stated that it would be unlikely that most students didn’t win 
at least four of the six “battlefields,” and that was the case.  The reason can be explained in the 
three takeaways from this exercise: (1) the end websites were assumed to be “undervalued,” so the 
set strategy won them cheaply against the students.  This is called focal point bias; (2) level-k 
reasoning was employed in the choices of 31 and 23 in the middle, just in case a student would 
allocate their units equally (20 on each “battlefield”), so level-k reasoning is germane when you 
have multiple dimensions, and we have that in cybersecurity; and (3) if you let level-k reasoning 
go too deep, you are overthinking the problem.  Understanding the allocation of resources leads to 
the Data Breach Exercise, which was used as the pre- and posttest of this module. (Hamman, 2018, 
Lesson 3 slides, slides 22-23) 
THE DATA BREACH EXERCISE, PRETEST AND POSTTEST 
This exercise is very similar to the DDoS Attack exercise described above, but the scenario was 
somewhat different.  The students were given this exercise as a pretest, and again, at the end of the 
module, as a posttest.  So they did have to identify themselves on their answer sheets.  But in no 
way were their answers graded.  As was the case for all of the exercises, the students were given a 
pass-fail grade indicating attendance.  They either were present, or they were not.  Students were 
not allowed to makeup the group exercises, as they had to be performed in a group.  Students were 
allowed to make-up any individual exercises that they missed. 
Description of the Data Breach Exercise 
The scenario describes a large company using an old, but deep-rooted mainframe computer used 
to collect new customer data.  Being as old as it is, the mainframe cannot be properly secured, so 
every weekend the company runs a large migration job that clears out the data off the mainframe 
and moves it to a secure server.  The company is concerned that an insider might copy all of the 
customer data off the mainframe and sell it on the black market.  Although they cannot technically 
prevent this, they regularly audit the log files.  In the future, they will allocate 100 man hours per 
week to the task of auditing mainframe’s daily logs. 
The company collects about the same amount of data each day, so the database grows linearly 
throughout the week.  The database starts fresh every Monday morning because of the weekend 
job that migrates data to the server.  Assume that the number of hours allocated to inspecting a 
6
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particular day’s jobs equals the likelihood of detecting an attack on that day.  So if X hours are 
assigned to reviewing a day’s logs, and an insider attacks on that day, then the probability of 
detecting the insider is X %.  We also should assume that if the insider is detected, the threat will 
be eliminated resulting in a “reward” equal to 10 points for the company.  Each student has been 
hired as a cybersecurity consultant, and the job of each is to allocate the 100 man hours over the 
five daily log files, ensuring that the integer percentages all add up to 100.  Each student then had 
to describe their reasoning.  While students who missed either the pre- or posttest exercises were 
offered the opportunity to make them up (within two days of the exercise), if any student had only 
done the pre- or posttest and not both, the exercise that they did perform was thrown out. 
Statistical Results, and Their Meaning 
The authors provided detailed instructions for scoring the exercise.  It was scored against actual 
data that they had collected from 33 computer science undergraduate students who had participated 
in the in the role of attackers.  Those students were tasked with selecting the one day of the week 
that they would attack (unlike the defenders who were tasked with allocating log inspecting hours 
across days.  The results from the attack students are provided in Figure 3, and are considered the 
control set for the exercise.  When viewing Figure 3, you can see that about one half of the attackers 
chose Wednesday, and about 1/3 chose Tuesday, about 1/6 chose Thursday, and none chose 
Monday or Friday.   
 Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday 
Percent of 
Attacks 
0% 36% 46% 18% 0% 
Value of Day 1 2 3 4 5 
Figure 3: Actual data used as a control to measure student class student data against. Hamman, S., 
(2018), Data Breach Exercise – Scoring_v10.docx 
The formula given for scoring the defender’s submissions is in Figure 4. The first half of the 
formula accumulates points in proportion to detecting an attack on a particular day.  In this 
exercise, the reward was stated as 10 points.  The second half of the formula deducts points in 
proportion to their likelihood of not detecting an attack on a particular day.  The final score is the 
sum of these values over all five days.  The authors give examples of a possible set of student 
allocations, and the calculation of that student’s points per day. 




Figure 4: Formula for scoring the defender’s submissions. Hamman, S., (2018), Data Breach Exercise – 
Scoring_v10.docx 
In the formula in Figure 4: ai = percentage of attackers who choose day i; di = percentage of 
hours allocated by the defender on day i; vi = value of day i; R = reward for detecting the attacker. 
In the example given in Figure 5, the total of the five days is -0.292.  In the Excel workbook 
they provided, the raw scores are normalized to values between 0 (minimum) and 100 (maximum).  
So in this example, the student’s final score would be 42.3.  These scores are not to be interpreted 
as a percentage grade, but “higher scores do indicate stronger adversarial thinking abilities.”  When 7
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comparing a student’s pretest to posttest scores, “the difference provides an indication as to how 
the student’s adversarial thinking abilities have changed over the course of the module.” (Hamman, 
2018, Data Breach Exercise – Scoring_v.10, p. 2-3) 
Example of student allocation of hours and resulting points per day: 
 Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday 
Percent of 
Hours 
16% 18% 20% 22% 24% 
Value of Day 1 2 3 4 5 
  Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday 
Points per Day 0 0.0576 -0.184 -0.1656 0 
Figure 5: Example of student allocation of hours and resulting points per day.  Hamman, S., (2018), 
Data Breach Exercise – Scoring_v10.docx. 
To give an idea of what actual student data looks like, the pre- and posttest data for the first 
three students (alphabetically) in the class is shown in Figure 6.  Only the first three students’ data 
is displayed because it would have been unwieldy to display the resulting data for all twenty-one 
students.  
Figure 6: Actual pre- and posttest data for the first three students in the class 
In order to analyze the entire class, a sample t-test was run in Excel, using the T.TEST 
function.  In order to ensure that analysis of the data had no effect on grades, entry of each student’s 
pre- and posttest data was entered into the provided spreadsheet after the course had been 
completed and grades had been posted.  The data confirmed that overall, the students’ adversarial 
thinking abilities had improved.  With an N = 19, the mean score pretest was 35.6.  The mean 
posttest score was 52.4.  16 out of 19, or 84.2% of the class, saw an improvement in their score.  
The p-value of the two-tailed t-test of paired pre-post scores was 0.001261, indicating that the 
results were statistically significant, and the improvement in mean score pre- and posttest was as 
expected.  
SURVEY 
In addition to calculating the class’ pretest – posttest data, an anonymous online survey was 
conducted.  Although voluntary, since this was an anonymous survey, the enticement to participate 
was that if all of the class participated, everyone would receive 10 points extra credit.  Sixteen 
students did participate, but unfortunately for the class, that was not 100% of the students enrolled.  
Nonetheless, I am including the results of the survey.  The survey consisted of seventeen 
statements, with the responses in the range of Strongly Agree to Strongly Disagree.  While some 
of the questions relate to the learning outcomes, several of the seventeen questions related 
PRE / Total Total Total
Student POST Mon Tue Wed Thu Fri Hours Mon Tue Wed Thu Fri Points (Raw) Points (Adj)
Student A PRE 5 10 10 25 50 100 0 -0.29 -0.78 -0.09 0 -1.16 27.8
Student A POST 3 10 16 21 50 100 0 -0.29 -0.42 -0.19 0 -0.902 32.1
Student B PRE 30 10 20 10 30 100 0 -0.29 -0.18 -0.47 0 -0.94 31.4
Student B POST 5 30 30 30 5 100 0 0.576 0.414 0.036 0 1.026 64.3
Student C PRE 25 20 10 20 25 100 0 0.144 -0.78 -0.22 0 -0.854 32.9
Student C POST 0 12 21 32 35 100 0 -0.2 -0.12 0.086 0 -0.2394 43.2
Hours submitted Points earned per day
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specifically to the various exercises, but only the questions related to the exercises discussed in 
this paper have been included, along with the more general questions.  
 
Survey Question Percent Responding 
Strongly Agree / Agree 
After being exposed to Lesson 1, I feel that I understand the 
overall concept of Adversarial Thinking and how it applies to 
hacking.   
87.5% 
I understand Sternberg’s Triarchic Theory (related to cognitive 
psychology) and how it helps me understand how hackers think.   
81.3% 
After completing Lesson 1, I feel that I understand the role of 
strategic reasoning in adversarial thinking 
81.3% 
The Battle of the Bismarck Sea exercise helped me understand 
the basics of Game Theory 
75.0% 
The various exercises in Lesson 2 on Game Theory helped me 
understand the role of best response analysis (putting yourself in 
the shoes of your adversary) in strategic reasoning. 
81.3% 
Participating in the 2/3 Guessing Game exercise helped me 
understand the concept of successive elimination of dominated 
strategies 
62.5% 
Participating in the 2/3 Guessing Game exercise helped me 
understand level-k reasoning as it applies to Behavioral Game 
theory 
56.3% 
Performing the DDoS exercise helped me understand the concepts 
of strategic resource allocation and level-k reasoning 
68.8% 
I feel that the entire Adversarial Thinking module was beneficial 
to my understanding of how a hacker thinks, and how to defend 
against a hacker.   
87.8% 
I feel that the time spent on Adversarial Thinking, versus the time 
that would have been spent on studying Network Security, was 
worth the inclusion of Adversarial Thinking in the course 
68.8% 




Katz: Adversarial Thinking: Teaching Students to Think Like a Hacker
Published by DigitalCommons@Kennesaw State University, 2019
 
CONCLUSIONS 
From the statistical analysis of the Data Breach Exercise pre- and posttest results, it is clear that 
the short module in adversarial thinking described in this paper improved the students’ adversarial 
thinking abilities – they were more able to think like a hacker, and thus able to understand how to 
allocate defensive assets to prevent attacks on an organization.  In addition, the results of the 
anonymous survey showed that the students felt that they benefited from the adversarial thinking 
module.  In their own literature, the authors indicate that this module can be taught to any level 
class in cybersecurity, but that it should be taught in a classroom, face-to-face.  The optimal course 
for this module at our university would be our 4000-level Ethical Hacking course, but that is 
usually taught online.  Consequently, since our introductory course in cybersecurity, open to all 
students, is usually taught in a classroom environment, it is likely that is the course in which this 
module will be taught in the future.  Regardless of which course that this module is taught in the 
future, the pretest – posttest and the survey will be administered to collect more data in order to 
further validate these results. 
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